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5. CONCLUSION
A binding regulation of lobbying activities at the EU level including the requirement to
register and to adhere to certain standards of behavior would be the most effective way of
regulating these activities. Examples, in the EU, but also in third countries (US, Canada)
show the variety of such mandatory approaches, but also their feasibility.
The legal basis for such a regulation can be found in Article 298 (2) TFEU concerning
lobbyists which target EU institutions engaged in administrative tasks. Based on the implied
powers doctrine, the EU’s competence could be extended to cover all activities addressing
EU organs and institutions engaged in administrative as well as legislative tasks.
A regulation based on Article 298 (2) TFEU and/or the implied powers doctrine could be
adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure.
Until a binding regulation is adopted, each EU institution can amend its own staff
regulations to address the behavior of its own staff vis-?-vis lobbyists. Furthermore, the
EU’s organs could change their own rules of procedure to regulate access of lobbyists to the
premises of these organs. This might then have a factually binding character. Such effects
could also be reached by the interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and
Commission in 2011.