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5.  CONCLUSION  
 
A binding regulation of lobbying activities at the EU level including the requirement to 
register and to adhere to certain standards of behavior would be the most effective way of 
regulating these activities. Examples, in the EU, but also in third countries (US, Canada) 
show the variety of such mandatory approaches, but also their feasibility.   
 
The legal basis for such a regulation can be found in Article 298 (2) TFEU concerning 
lobbyists which target EU institutions engaged in administrative tasks. Based on the implied 
powers doctrine, the EU’s competence could be extended to cover all activities addressing 
EU organs and institutions engaged in administrative as well as legislative tasks.  
 
A regulation based on Article 298 (2) TFEU and/or the implied powers doctrine could be 
adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure. 
 
Until a binding regulation is adopted, each EU institution can amend its own staff 
regulations to address the behavior of its own staff vis-?-vis lobbyists. Furthermore, the 
EU’s organs could change their own rules of procedure to regulate access of lobbyists to the 
premises of these organs. This might then have a factually binding character. Such effects 
could also be reached by the interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and 
Commission in 2011.