45 mobilise finance for investments in key areas such as infrastructure, education, re- search and innovation. For this purpose, an investment pipeline of strategic projects supported by a specialist investment hub of technical assistance will be provided. Fi- nally, barriers to investment are to be removed and improvements in the regulatory regime achieved. As a leverage effect of 15 through the use of financial instruments by the EIB is expected, the 21 bn. Euros are supposed to deliver the overall investment volume of 315 bn. Euros. Funding shall be provided to both public and private investors mostly for long-term large scale investment (240 bn. Euros) and to a smaller extent (75 bn. Euros) to support investment by small and medium sized firms. An even larger in- vestment volume is suggested to the extent that contributions from the private sector or from the member states increase the guaranteed capital. Indeed, in order to enable member states to contribute, the Commission has made it clear that such contributions will be excluded from both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGB (European Commission 2015b: 6-7). It is difficult to evaluate the prospects of the Investment Plan for Europe as it is still in its very early stages. However, there are many open questions and whether the Plan will really deliver is quite doubtful. First of all, one may call into question whether the volume of the plan is large enough. Even if it really led to 315 bn. Euros of additional investment that would be about 2.25 per cent of EU GDP or 3 per cent of Euro area GDP spread over three years, i.e. 0.75 or 1 per cent of GDP per year, respectively. Given the depth of the economic crisis, particularly in the euro area, this may well be too little. Furthermore, given the long term character of many of the large scale invest- ment projects it will probably take quite a long time before a significant number of pro- jects will be realized. The most important doubts, however, relate to the question whether the Plan will really be able to mobilise sufficient additional investment: If it is to stimulate private invest- ment, particularly in the crisis countries typically animal spirits will be low, which means that it will be difficult to find investors irrespective of the terms of the programme. If in- vestors are found, then the danger of windfall gains, i.e. that the investors would have chosen the project, anyway, could be large. And if they really invest because of the favourable conditions of the programme, the question as to the efficiency of the pro- gramme arises, especially if it is a PPP project: If the fund offers private investors at- tractive returns then these returns will have to be paid for, either directly by the public contributor involved or indirectly through charges to the private sector that might other- wise have been avoided. If the fund is to stimulate public investment, one may wonder why this could not be realized by national governments’ regular investment. If it is be- cause of fiscal constraints due to the stability and growth pact, an obvious alternative