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other countries we find a positive effect of migration in Italy, clearly driven by manufacturing
sectors, while there is no statistically significant effect in the US, Denmark or Spain.
Technology
We do not find a significant negative effect of ICT capital services on the wage share in
France except for specification 5 when estimated using the within estimator only. Non-ICT
capital has the same positive effect as in Austria in first difference but the sign switches to
negative when the within estimator is applied. The effect of ICT capital is even less robust for
Germany where the variable is found to be positive or statistically insignificant in basically
all specifications except for the manufacturing sector sample only if estimated using the
within estimator. The effect is confirmed for two specifications for high skilled
manufacturing in first difference estimations. The same applies to non-ICT capital services
that exhibit a robust positive sign only for the manufacturing sector pool, which is however
robust to the application of different estimation methodologies. Similarly, the variables
appear to be insignificant for most of the specifications for the UK. ICT capital intensity
appears to have a negative impact on the wage share in the US, Italy and Spain, although we
do not find an indication of a skill bias for the effect of ICT in any of these countries.
Furthermore, in the US and Spain, equivalent to estimations for Austria, the coefficient for
ICT is statistically not different from zero when we include variables accounting for the
effect of financialisation and migration. Additionally, ICT capital turns insignificant in Spain
when the first difference estimator is applied. On the other hand we find a robust positive
impact of non-ICT capital in the US, Italy, Denmark and Spain.
Countryâ€“level variables and measures of bargaining power
Turning to our measures of bargaining power our results differ significantly across countries.
We report estimation results using our sectoral measure of union density but results are robust
to the application of the aggregate variable. We find very strong, robust positive effects of
union density for Germany, mainly driven by the manufacturing sector. This is not surprising
given the long tradition of sector-level wage negotiations in Germany. Similarly, we obtain a
positive impact of union density in Italy and Spain, while there is no statistically significant
effect in Denmark. In France there is no robust effect of union density, and in fact the
variable seems to have a perverse negative effect in some of the specifications using the
within estimator. However, union density was always quite low in France and is arguably not