interest includes the realization of basic rights such as the right to health or education, but the
general interest cannot be limited to policies pursuing those rights.

In order to further clarify its concept, the proposed model clause also makes use of an
illustrative list of potential regulations, regulatory instruments or goals. The list is not
exhaustive and therefore allows for future and different regulatory approaches. The list refers
to the most common public service obligations employed by Member States. It clarifies that
the definition does not only rely on technical regulations or quality standards, but also
includes market access restrictions such as public monopolies or other forms of limiting
competition. Universal service or universal access obligations are requirements to supply a
service or provide access to services in the same manner and at comparable conditions
concerning quality and price throughout a geographic territory. Mandatory contracting
schemes or price caps are regulatory instruments which limit the freedom of contract of the
service providers. The limitation of the number or services or service suppliers through
monopolies, exclusive service supplier schemes such as concessions, quotas, economic needs
tests or other quantitative or qualitative restrictions are measures which would normally
violate the market access requirements of a trade agreement. The express inclusion of
concessions in this definition seems useful, because of the frequent use of these instruments in
the organization of public services. Concessions are seen as one form of a regulatory regime
of public services. Finally, the mode clause refers to regulations aiming at a high level of
quality, safety and affordability as well as equal treatment of users. This is an explicit
reference to Art. 1 of Protocol No. 26 on Services of General Interest. It indicates that the
regulatory restrictions imposed on public service suppliers usually aim at one or all of these
purposes.

The model clause not only covers public services, but also governmental measures aimed at
regulating, providing or financing these services. This is important because many challenges
of special governmental measures will be raised by or on behalf of commercial service
providers who will argue that a particular measure discriminates against them or restricts their
market access. For example, if a commercial provider of private education services would
argue that special conditions which are given to public education providers are discriminatory,
it might not be sufficient for the government defending that measure to argue that public
education is not covered by the agreement, but that the specific measure is also not covered by
the agreement.

b) Level of protection

The proposed model clause establishes a broad exclusion and applies to the entire agreement
or at least to the entire chapter on investment and services. Depending on the structure of the
agreement, the latter scope of the exclusion clause would not apply to government
procurement and might also not extend to subsidies or domestic regulation if these are
addressed in different chapters. This needs to be kept in mind when designing the specific
clause.

The exclusion of public services in the proposed clause would be similar to the general
exclusion of audiovisual services from the scope of the investment and services chapters in
EU free trade agreements. However, the proposed clause would go beyond the audiovisual
carve-out by also excluding measures regulating, providing and financing public services.
This seems necessary if the clause should also provide full protection against claims under an investment chapter. The exclusion of public services from the scope of the investment chapter means that an investor or investment does not fall under the ambit of the agreement if the investment concerns public services. For example, if a private investor would be awarded a concession to operate a regional bus line which contains requirements concerning routes, frequencies and price schemes, this concession could be considered a specific regulatory regime and would make the bus service a public service. Hence, the investment would be an investment in the field of public services which are not protected under the investment chapter.

Excluding public services from the investment chapter would not exclude claims from investors in other sectors which are related to public services. If, in the above example, a private bus operator not subject to the requirements of a concession would raise a claim against the granting of the concession, that claim would be unfounded, because it would be a claim against a governmental measure regulating, providing and financing public services because such a measure could not be attacked on the basis of the agreement.³

This would also apply to a claim invoking the so-called umbrella clause. Umbrella clauses extend the scope of the investment protection chapter to specific commitments of a state towards an investor. In practice, these commitments are usually contained in a state-investor contract covering a specific project. Sometimes this can also be part of a concession agreement. An investor relying on the umbrella clause claims a violation of the investor-state-contract as violation of the standards of the investment protection chapter. However, if the measure attacked by the investor would be a measure regulating, providing and financing public services it would not fall within the scope of the investment chapter. Consequently, the investor could not circumvent the exclusion of public services by relying on the umbrella clause, because the investment chapter would not be applicable in the first place.

V. Potential critique of the proposed model clauses and alternatives

The proposed model clause would substantially deviate from the existing EU model. It could be criticized based on two arguments which can, however, be rejected.

1. Unilateral determination of the scope of an international agreement

A first challenge to the model proposed here could be based on the argument that the model allows Member States to unilaterally determine the scope of the agreement by declaring an activity as public service. Arguably, this would be contrary to the general purpose and function of an international agreement: If states would be capable of excluding the application of an agreement through unilateral measures they could easily escape the disciplines of the agreement and therefore defeat its purpose.

³ It should be noted that excluding concessions from the definition of investment in an investment protection chapter of the treaty may not solve this problem. In the case discussed the investment is not the concession itself, but the physical infrastructure or the actual capital invested in the operation of the bus line. Hence an exclusion of concessions although useful in other contexts would not be a sufficient safeguard for public services.